It’s October 13th, 2026. This week on Uranium Spotlight, we look at the term pounds that quietly appeared on the books. Then we turn to Kazakhstan’s surprising vote against a Russian uranium deal, and India’s plan to double its domestic production. We close with a new milestone for western enrichment at Urenco’s plant in New Mexico.
Counting the Hidden Pounds
The spot price opened the week at $89.60 per pound U3O8 and closed on Friday at $89.80 per pound U3O8. It was a modest gain in a market that remains unusually thin for October.
September’s record low activity carried into the new month. Only five spot deals were confirmed, totalling about 550,000 pounds. Buying interest finally stirred on Thursday, and bids and offers tightened into Friday’s close. The long term price held at $96.00 per pound U3O8, still a record.
The real story was in the term ledger. Term contracting so far this year: 77.7 million pounds, against 44.0 million at this point last year. Two weeks ago, this year’s tally sat near 42 million pounds. Most of the jump came from awards signed earlier in the year and only now confirmed.
Most of each year’s volume gets signed in the fourth quarter, and this one has started slowly. About 1 million pounds have been contracted in October so far. Last year’s fourth quarter brought roughly 70 million pounds, so the heavy lifting still lies ahead. Several utilities are evaluating offers, and three more are working through formal requests for information.
The Sprott trust is trading at an 11.6% discount to net asset value and has bought no pounds since July 30th. The trust last traded at or above its asset value at the end of April, so it still cannot raise new money.
Geopolitics stayed in the foreground. Rosatom’s head warned that restrictions on Russian uranium would hit markets harder than oil sanctions, because the uranium market is far more concentrated. That warning landed in the same week Kazakhstan declined a Russian supply deal, a story we turn to next.
For investors, the key takeaway is that the weekly flow of tenders understates what utilities are actually doing. Much of this year’s contracting happened off market and surfaced months later. The more reliable signal is the confirmed year to date total, and it now sits well ahead of last year’s pace.
A Vote Against Moscow
Kazatomprom held an extraordinary shareholder meeting last week, and the result caught the market’s attention. Shareholders approved a uranium sale to China, but rejected a separate supply deal with Russia.
Under Kazakh rules, unusually large transactions go to a shareholder vote. These meetings have become one of the few public windows into where Kazakh uranium is heading. Most past votes have been routine approvals for buyers in China and Russia.
The Chinese buyer this time was a state-owned subsidiary of the State Power Investment Corporation, a major builder and financier of Chinese reactors. That spot contract passed with nearly 89% support.
The Russian deal went very differently. The buyer was Uranium One, a Rosatom subsidiary and already a major producer inside Kazakhstan. The contract needed only a simple majority, yet about 88% of votes abstained. Only around 5% voted in favour, and just over 6% voted against.
The state’s holding company controls the large majority of Kazatomprom’s shares. With that many votes abstaining, the state clearly did not back the deal. In effect, Astana let the contract fail without having to vote it down.
Kazatomprom gave no reason, and disclosed no volumes or prices for either contract. That silence leaves room for interpretation, so some caution is warranted. Still, the timing is hard to ignore.
Russia recently restricted exports of sulphuric acid, which Kazatomprom needs to run its in situ wellfields. Kazakhstan is the main buyer of that Russian acid. Kazatomprom has said its suppliers are seeking export approvals, but no exemption has been announced.
Against that backdrop, a refusal to sell Russia more uranium looks less like routine business. It may be leverage, or it may signal a wider cooling between the two governments. Either way, Kazakhstan’s ties with China appear to be strengthening. Its ties with Moscow appear to be getting more complicated.
For investors, this vote is a reminder that Kazakh supply is a political allocation, not just a production number. Kazakhstan mines close to 40% of the world’s uranium, and a growing share is flowing east. Western utilities cannot assume those pounds will be available to them, whichever way the Russian relationship turns.
India’s Fuel Gap
India’s state uranium miner wants to double its output by 2036. The Uranium Corporation of India announced the plan this past week, tied directly to the country’s ambitious reactor build.
India is targeting 100 gigawatts of nuclear capacity by 2047. Today it operates about 25 reactors with roughly 9 gigawatts of capacity. That is more than a tenfold expansion in a little over two decades.
The company’s chairman said growth will come from expanding existing mines and developing new projects. Its seven mines in the eastern state of Jharkhand will remain the production hub. New projects are planned in four other states, along with a plant to recover uranium from copper mine tailings.
India does not publish its uranium production, citing strategic reasons. Domestic mines currently fuel close to 40% of the country’s nuclear generation. The rest comes from imports, mainly from Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan and Canada.
Doubling output still leaves India far short. A parliamentary committee estimates its expanded heavy water fleet alone will need about 5,400 tonnes of U3O8 a year. That is nearly 12 million pounds, and domestic output covers only about 30% of it.
That estimate also excludes the large light water reactors in India’s plan. This week, the state power utility NTPC named three potential sites for new nuclear plants. Each could host 2 to 4 gigawatts. The utility is weighing reactor technology from American, French and Russian vendors.
India is working the import side as well. Its long term supply contract with Uzbekistan expires this year, and officials are looking to replace it. The government has also signalled interest in taking equity positions in foreign mines.
The doubling plan is a nod toward resource independence, but India will never be self-sufficient in uranium. Its geology simply does not support it, and the reactor build is moving faster than its mines can.
The takeaway for investors is that India is becoming a buyer of scale, not a source of supply. Even doubled domestic output leaves most future needs to be met abroad. That adds another large, state-backed customer competing with western utilities for the same uncommitted pounds.
Enrichment Comes Home
Urenco has started production from a new centrifuge cascade at its enrichment plant in New Mexico. Owned by British, Dutch and German shareholders, Urenco is the largest enricher outside Russia.
This is the sixth of eight new cascades in its current American expansion. Together, the eight will add about 700,000 separative work units of annual capacity by 2027. A separative work unit, or SWU, measures the effort needed to enrich uranium.
The New Mexico plant already produces about 4.3 million SWU a year. Urenco is targeting more than 7 million SWU there within a decade. Construction of a second plant on the site is planned for 2029, with first output in 2032.
The timing matters. American imports of Russian enriched uranium are set to be fully banned from 2028. Across its global sites, Urenco is adding 4.6 million SWU of new capacity to help fill that gap.
Enrichment has been the tightest bottleneck in the western fuel cycle. Expansion like this is how western utilities replace Russian services, one cascade at a time. It does not solve the uranium supply gap, but it removes one of the excuses for staying tied to Russia.
For investors, there is a detail worth watching. Much of the enriched product utilities bought from Russia arrived with the uranium already inside it. When they switch to western enrichers like Urenco, they must source and deliver that natural uranium feed themselves. Every unit of Russian enriched product replaced in the west becomes new demand for western uranium and conversion.
Disclaimer: Uranium Spotlight is your weekly podcast dedicated to the latest developments shaping the uranium fuel market and its role in the global energy landscape, sponsored by Purepoint Uranium Group. While our passion for the sector is undeniable, nothing discussed here should be considered investment advice. Our mission is to provide a clear, balanced view of the forces influencing uranium prices and the nuclear fuel cycle. For deeper analysis and market briefings, visit purepoint.ca.